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Recently in the US, Public-Private Partnerships (P3) have been increasingly utilized 
as a mechanism for closing the gap between revenues and expenditures in 
transportation mega-projects, however public perception remains a major challenge to 
successful utilization.  Recent projects have run into issues with public perception 
particularly where non-compete provisions are utilized.  The conventional wisdom is 
that non-compete provisions in public-private partnership contracts are a zero-sum 
game, in which the losses of one party directly balance the gains of the other.  
However, the design and selection of non-compete provisions can be such that the 
objectives of the public and private sectors are aligned. This study examines the non-
compete provisions in P3 contracts in the US to date and the associated risk. Real 
options analysis is then utilized to value the flexibility lost to non-compete 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Background 
Public agencies in the U.S. have increasingly considered using public-private 
partnerships (P3s) as a mechanism for closing the gap between revenues and 
expenditures in transportation mega-projects.  The Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) broadly defines a P3 as “a contractual agreement formed between public 
and private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than is 
traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with a 
private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or 
system.” (FHWA, 2004) This definition applies to a wide variety of projects, however 
P3s most commonly refer to P3 concessions, projects where the private sector 
assumes some risks and rewards for financing, constructing, and/or operating and 
maintaining a facility.  
Public agencies pursue P3s for several reasons, including expanded financial 
capacity and optimal risk allocation. However, there are many potential P3 concerns 
and controversies, including loss of public control and flexibility. Many point to non-
compete provisions, which FHWA defines as a clause which prohibits or limits the 
public sector’s ability to improve transportation facilities that compete with a private 
facility for traffic demand, as evidence of this (FHWA, 2016b). Non-compete 
provisions are often used to mitigate the private sector risk that traffic volumes will 





sector interest in a project. Past high profile projects, such as the SR-91 Express 
Lanes in California, in which the public sector ultimately bought back the facility 
from the private sector following a violation of the non-compete clause, have 
contributed to skepticism of non-compete clauses specifically and P3s generally. The 
conventional wisdom is that non-compete provisions in public-private partnership 
contracts are a zero-sum game, in which the losses of one party directly balance the 
gains of the other. However, the design and selection of non-compete provisions can 
be such that the objectives of the public and private sectors are not in direct conflict 
with each other.  Balancing risks while maximizing the objectives of both parties is 
key to the successful delivery of any P3 project. To do this, accepted methodologies 
for evaluating the use of non-compete provisions must be in place, along with best 
practice for the design and selection of non-compete provisions.  
This document aims to give an overview of the use of non-compete provisions 
in the U.S. from their inception to today, evaluate the associated risk, and estimate the 
value of non-compete provisions using real options analysis.  
The second chapter of this study provides an overview of the use of non-
compete provisions in the U.S. from the early 1990s until today and compares the risk 
associated with each provision type using statistical analysis. The third chapter 
introduces real options analysis and uses a case study of the SR-91 Express Lanes in 
California to value the social benefits associated with a competing facility that are 





1.2 Topic Importance 
A study of the critical success factors of P3s in the U.S. identified political 
support, and community support as two of the five most critical factors accounting for 
the success of a P3 project (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). The public has historically 
been skeptical of the use of P3 procurement in the US; a reality which can limit 
public sector flexibility in short and long-range transportation planning.  This 
skepticism is acutely shown in relation to non-compete provisions, as past and current 
projects have demonstrated. This criticism is not entirely unfounded. A study of early 
toll concessions in Australia showed that contracts were slightly skewed in favor of 
the private sector, particularly where revenue risk mitigation strategies such as 
guarantees were concerned (Alonso-Conde et al., 2007).  
Therefore, there is a need to understand the cost of complex contract 
provisions, such as non-compete provisions to the public sector to ensure that these 
provisions are in the interest of both parties. Further understanding the trade-offs 
associated with risk mitigation strategies is also essential to increase political and 










Chapter 2: Non-Compete Provision Evolution & Revenue Risk 
 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
Recently in the US, Public-Private Partnerships (P3) have been increasingly 
utilized as a mechanism for closing the gap between revenues and expenditures in 
transportation mega-projects.  According to the Federal Highway Administration, 
there are currently 35 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico which have P3 
enabling legislation, while the Build America Transportation Investment Center 
points out that additional states have P3 activities without P3 enabling legislation, and 
still more are contemplating P3 enabling legislation currently (FHWA, 2016b; 
BATIC, 2016). However, as Garvin and Bosso (2008) note, P3 activity is not 
necessarily an indicator of effectiveness. Major challenges to successful utilization 
remain, including public perception. Community and political support have been 
identified as key factors accounting for success in P3 projects, however they are often 
lacking (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015).  Mostaan and Ashuri (2017) echo this in 
identifying turbulent political conditions and lack of political support as a major 
challenge to P3 development.   
Recent projects have run into issues with public perception particularly where 
non-compete provisions are utilized.  The I-77 Expressway in North Carolina is one 
notable recent example of this negative perception.  Several articles in the Charlotte 
Observer, as well as publications by organizations specifically opposing the project, 





themes cut across these publications.  First, the feeling that the private sector was 
getting a better deal was pervasive with many parties, specifically noting that the 
contract was revised to exclude projects from exemption to the compensation clause.  
Additionally, the length of the concession term was a sticking point for many who felt 
as though the project would guarantee congestion for decades to come. Lastly, 
questions of equality were raised as the provision was perceived to easily allow for 
additional toll lanes, but expressly exclude additional general purpose lanes 
(Harrison, 2015a, 2015b; Widen I-77, 2017).  These same themes were seen in the 
opposition to non-compete provisions in the Midtown/Downtown Tunnel project in 
Virginia, with the Washington Post arguing that the non-compete provision combined 
with the length of the concession period is setting the area up for failure for 
generations to come (Laris, 2016).  These negative feelings are pervasive and tied to 
historical experience, from past P3 projects, and feelings related to protecting the 
public good, such as infrastructure. 
With the passing of the “Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) 
Act” by Congress, a clear emphasis has been made on the utilization of public-private 
partnerships, but also on the need to better understand the non-compete provisions 
that are often included in P3 contracts; The FAST Act mandates that best practices be 
developed for non-compete provisions.   This development of best practices and 
dissemination of knowledge regarding non-compete provisions will be critical in 
balancing the attractiveness of public-private partnerships with protecting the public 





There have been several examples of P3 projects in the United States where 
the inclusion and/or exclusion of a non-compete provision has had unexpected 
consequences for the public or private sector.  On the State Road 91 project in 
California, the public sector was forced into a buy back of the project in order to 
expand merge lanes from SR-91 to a competing toll road; this was due to a non-
compete provision which prohibited increasing capacity within a 1.5-mile corridor 
surrounding the project.  Conversely, on the Dulles Greenway project in Virginia, the 
concessionaire began to default shortly after the project opened due in part to lower 
than anticipated toll revenues.  In this project case, no non-compete provision was 
included in the agreement and Virginia was free to increase capacity on VA Route 7, 
an un-tolled parallel facility (Persad et al., 2005). As these examples seem to suggest, 
the conventional wisdom is that non-compete provisions in public-private partnership 
contracts are a zero-sum game, in which the losses of one party directly balance the 
gains of the other.  However, the design and selection of non-compete provisions can 
be such that the objectives of the public and private sectors are not in direct conflict 
with each other.  Balancing risks while maximizing the objectives of both parties is 
key to the successful delivery of any P3 project.  To achieve this, as the FAST Act 
both suggests and mandates, best practices must be developed which help the public-
sector in the design and selection of non-compete provisions including caps on 
compensation and buy-back guidance, among other recommendations. Currently 
there do not exist widely agreed upon best practices for the design and selection of 
non-compete provisions, nor methodologies for evaluating past, current, and future 





2 – Non-Compete Provision Review 
The Federal Highway Administration defines a contract non-compete clause 
as one that constricts the public sector’s ability to improve existing facilities or 
construct new facilities that compete with the P3 facility for travel demand (FHWA, 
2016b).  Although these provisions can garner much attention, as seen in the Dulles 
Greenway and SR-91 cases, as well as in the media coverage of the I-77 Express 
Lanes and Elizabeth River Tunnels, they do not exist in all toll concession contracts.  
Several states have prohibited the use of non-compete clauses altogether; one notable 
example of this is the Texas statute which states that an agreement “may not contain a 
provision that limits or prohibits the construction, reconstruction, expansion, 
rehabilitation, operation or maintenance of a highway or other transportation project” 
(FHWA, 2016b).  
In contracts that contain and have contained non-compete provisions, the 
language referring to competing facilities has taken a variety of forms.  Additionally, 
these non-compete provisions have evolved since their inception in the United States 
in the early 1990s, a trend that is seen in not only non-compete provisions, but the P3 
process generally. Wang (2015) argues that P3 projects have evolved in two phases, 
from a private development model which maximizes private participation, to a 
collaborative partnership model in which responsibilities and risks are shared. Wang 
argues that this evolution has occurred due to lessons learned and implemented risk 
management strategies on the part of the public sector in contract terms, among other 
project characteristics. The SR-91 project is cited to demonstrate this change in 
contract terms following a project that was not seen as serving the public interest. 





course of this period as well. Buxbaum and Ortiz (2009), and Iseki and Houtman 
(2012), argue that changes in non-compete provisions have occurred due to lessons 
learned from past projects, specifically those with restrictive non-compete clauses 
such as SR-91 in California.  From these past projects, lessons learned include the 
importance of striking a balance between the objectives of the public and private 
sectors, and the necessity of developing methods for identifying and permitting 
improvements which may be necessary for achieving the public sector’s objectives. 
These changes have been incorporated into what is deemed the ‘second generation’ of 
non-compete clauses, the limited compete clause, which acknowledges some need for 
public sector improvements. 
For this study, an analysis of available toll concession and long term lease 
contracts was conducted to further explore the state of practice and use of non-
compete provisions from their early occurrences in the United States to today.  For 
this analysis 13 contracts dating from 1993 to 2014 were surveyed.  This analysis 
found that only two of the surveyed contracts contained no competing facilities 
provision, or non-compete language. Additionally, both contracts appeared to be 
special cases.  The first, Dulles Greenway, was one of the first toll-concession 
contracts in the U.S. and in many ways served as a lesson for future projects. The 
other, the Chicago Skyway, is a long-term lease concession in a densely-populated 
area, with little possibility of expansion of existing or new facilities (Buxbaum and 
Ortiz, 2009).  In all other contracts, 85%, competing facilities were regulated in some 
way. In reviewing these non-compete provisions it became clear that an evolution has 





the most recent, the I-77 Express Lanes in North Carolina.   This analysis observed 
the shift from strict non-compete provisions to limited compete provisions, however 
an additional distinct provision type was observed.  In more recent contracts, those 
which reached financial close within the past 10 years, there appears to be a trend 
toward competing facilities compensation clauses, those which specify no restrictions 
based on geography or existing transportation plans.  
In general, these provisions have changed from ones which expressly 
acknowledged the negative impact of competing facilities on the toll revenue of the 
concessionaire, and limited the government’s ability to construct competing facilities 
in the 1990s, what will be referred to as strict non-compete provisions, to contracts in 
the 2010s which grant the State Departments of Transportation an unfettered right to 
construct and improve facilities, regardless of their impact on the private facility, 
while setting up a compensation structure for the impact on toll revenue from 
competing facilities if and when they occur.  This explicit acknowledgement of the 
rights of the State are seen in both the limited compete clauses and competing 
facilities compensation clauses; a specific compensation structure related to 
competing facilities is seen in many, but not all of the contracts containing limited 
compete clauses as well. The table below shows this distribution: 
Project Provision Type Financial 
Close 
Pocahontas 895  Non-Compete 1998 
SR-91 Non-Compete 7/20/1993 





Chicago Skyway No Provision 8/1/2005 
Indiana Toll road Non-Compete 6/29/2006 
I-495 HOT Lanes Limited Compete 12/20/2007 
SH 130 Limited Compete 3/7/2008 








IH 635 Managed Lanes 
(LBJ Expressway) 
Limited Compete 6/22/2010 
I-95 Express Lanes Competing Facilities 
Compensation 
7/1/2012 
US-36 Competing Facilities 
Compensation 
2/26/2014 
I-77 Express Lanes Competing Facilities 
Compensation  
5/20/2015 
Table 2.1 – Non-compete provision type & date of financial close 
The contracts executed in the 1990s include projects which have become 
notable and controversial due to issues relating to competing facilities. These include 
the Dulles Greenway project in Virginia and State Road 91 in California.  As 
discussed, the Dulles Greenway example is notable as there was no non-compete 
language present in the contract and due in part to a competing facility, VA Route 7, 





State Road 91 contract did contain non-compete language outlining the 
concessionaire’s “Exclusivity of Rights”.  Article 3.2 – Exclusivity of Rights states 
that: 
"…Caltrans shall not during the term of this Agreement grant or convey any 
franchise or other similar regulatory or contract rights to any party other than CPTC 
in connection with, and will not finance with public funds within Caltrans' 
discretionary control (either directly or by provision of governmental guarantees of a 
financial or commercial nature) the design, financing, construction or operation 
within the Absolution Protection Zone of any public transportation facility, project or 
program” (Caltrans, 1993).   
The contract outlines a few exceptions to this covenant, but also provides 
sweeping, general rules for determining if a proposed facility presents economic 
competition to the toll facility.  These guidelines state that a facility will be 
considered to present economic competition if it is designed to Expressway or higher 
specifications and if it facilitates transportation movements to the east and west.   
2.2.1 Strict Non-Compete Clauses 
The Pocahontas 895 in Virginia is the only other contract surveyed which was 
executed in the 1990s.  This contract takes a similar approach to that of the State 
Route 91 contract in prohibiting the State from pursuing competing facilities.  In this 
contract, it is stated that the Department will not pursue competing facilities, and will 
even actively discourage their implementation.  In Section 12.1 – Competitive 





 “(a) The Department acknowledges that Competitive Transportation Facilities may 
adversely affect Toll Revenues and materially impede the repayment of the Bonds, 
and that Operator may be unable to finance the Project if there is a significant risk 
that Competitive Transportation Facilities will adversely affect Toll Revenues or 
impede repayment of the Bonds without Operator having certain rights to receive 
compensation for proven economic impacts. In consideration thereof, for a period 
commencing on the Agreement Date and ending on the expiration or earlier 
termination of this Agreement, the Department shall not, except as permitted in 
subsection (b) below: (i) initiate, authorize, franchise or finance private Competitive 
Transportation Facilities; (ii) open any Department owned or operated Competitive 
Transportation Facilities; and (iii) fail to exercise all discretionary authority 
available to it under Laws, Regulations and Ordinances to prevent any other 
governmental or private entity from developing Competitive Transportation facilities, 
including but not limited to connections to State Highways.” (VDOT, 1998) 
Although some consider the Pocahontas 895 concession to be an example of a 
limited compete provision, because it expressly acknowledges the adverse impact of 
competing facilities on toll revenues and makes no reference to the rights of the State 
it is considered a non-compete provision in this analysis.  Qualifications do exist 
which allow for distribution of federally mandated funds and permit the State 
Department of Transportation to provide advice that it deems to be in the best interest 
of the state.  Additionally, this contract does not include terms of compensation or 
resolution for when a situation arises where the construction or improvement of a 





and will not occur.  However, the SR-91 case shows that it can, and in doing so can 
create major issues for the State actors.  
The only contract containing a non-compete provision that did not reach 
financial close in the 1990s was the Indiana Toll Road; it reached financial close in 
June of 2006. This project is unique in that it does not include a specific competing 
facilities provision, but does define “Competing Highway” and sets up a 
compensation structure.  This agreement does define competing facilities more 
narrowly, as comparable facilities (limited access roads), and does allow for 
improvements to existing facilities within the specified geographic zone (Buxbaum 
and Ortiz, 2007). As with the case of the Pocahontas 895 concession, its specification 
of a non-compete zone and failure to acknowledge the rights of the State lead to its 
consideration as a non-compete clause.  Table 2.2 includes the key components and 
language of the non-compete provisions included in this analysis, SR-91 and 
Pocahontas 895: 
Project Non-Compete Provision - Unifying Language 
SR-91 
Article 3.2 - Exclusivity of Rights:  
"Caltrans shall not during the term of this Agreement grant or convey any 
franchise or other similar regulatory or contract rights to any party other than 
CPTC in connection with, and will not finance with public funds within 
Caltrans' discretionary control (either directly or by provision of governmental 





construction or operation within the Absolution Protection Zone of any public 
transportation facility, project or program" (Caltrans, 1993) 
Pocahontas 
895 
Section 12.1:  
"(a) The Department acknowledges that Competitive Transportation Facilities 
may adversely affect Toll Revenues and materially impede the repayment of 
the Bonds, and that Operator may be unable to finance the Project if there is a 
significant risk that Competitive Transportation Facilities will adversely affect 
Toll Revenues...The Department shall not, except as permitted in subsection b: 
(i) initiate, authorize, franchise or finance private Competitive Transportation 
facilities; (ii) open any Department owned or operated Competitive 
Transportation Facilities; and (iii) fail to exercise all discretionary authority 
available to it under Laws, Regulations and Ordinances to prevent any other 
governmental or private entity from developing Competitive Transportation 
Facilities, including but not limited to connections to State Highways." 
(VDOT, 1998) 
Table 2.2 – Non-Compete Clause Unifying Language 
2.2.2 Limited Compete Provisions 
The lessons learned from the projects of the 1990s resulted in a wide variety 
of mechanisms for addressing competing facilities. Collectively, these provisions are 
often referred to as limited compete provisions (Buxbaum and Ortiz, 2009).  The 





early 2000s, with one reaching financial close in 2010.  All projects which fall under 
this category recognize the “unfettered right” and responsibility the public sector has 
to develop or expand competing facilities, regardless of the impact these facilities 
have on the Developer and their revenue stream. Table 2.3 details this similarity in 
language: 
Project Limited Compete Provision - Unifying Language 
I-495 HOT 
Lanes 
Section 9.02 - Project Enhancements by the Department: "The Department 
shall have unfettered rights to finance, develop, approve, expand, improve, 
modify, upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, renew and replace any existing 
and new transportation or other facilities.  In no event shall the taking of any 
such action by the Department constitute a default by the Department under 





Article 11.3.1.1 "Except for the limited rights to compensation provided to 
Developer under Section 11.3.2, TxDOT will have the unfettered right in 
its sole discretion, at any time and without liability, regardless of impacts on 
Toll Revenues to finance, develop, approve, expand, improve, modify, 
upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, restore, renew and replace 
any existing and new transportation or other facilities." (TXDOT, 2009) 
SH 130 
11.3.1 - "Except for the limited rights to compensation provided to Developer 
under Section 11.3.2, TxDOT will have the unfettered right in its sole 
discretion, at any time and without liability, to finance, develop, approve, 





rehabilitate, restore, renew and replace any existing and new transportation or 
other facilities." (TXDOT, 2007) 
Table 2.3 – Limited Compete Clause Unifying Language 
These provisions limit the facilities that can be considered competing in a 
variety of ways.  Each is unique, but approaches generally include a geographic 
exclusion zone, or the exclusion of projects already present in various planning 
documents. Excerpts from the contract documents showing this range are included in 
the table below: 
Project Limited Compete Provision - Unifying Language 
I-495 HOT 
Lanes 
Section 9.02 (f) -"The parties agree that the Department may, at its sole cost 
and discretion, develop, design, finance, construct, operate, and maintain the 
following improvements: (i) a flyover ramp from the northbound GP Lanes to 
westbound lanes along I-66; (ii) improvements to I-66 outside the Capital 
Beltway Corridor; (iii) improvements to the interchange of the GP Lanes and 
the Dulles Toll Road (the "DTR"); (iv) right hand ramps and flyovers from the 
northbound GP Lanes to the westbound lanes of the DTR; (v) ramps or flyovers 
from southbound GP Lanes to eastbound along the DTR; (vi) connections from 
DTR/Dulles Airport Access Road (the "DAAR") westbound to the northbound 
and southbound HOT Lanes; and (vii) connections from the southbound HOT 










Exhibit 18 - "Unplanned Revenue Impacting Facilities exclude all projects 
included in any of the following long range transportation plans and programs: 
206-208 Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP); Unified 
Transportation Program (UTP) (2006), 2006 Statewide Preservation Program 
(SPP), 2006 Statewide Mobility Program (SMP); Mobility 2025 Plan, 
Amended Paril 2006 by the Regional Transportation Council, the MPO for the 
Dallas Forth Worth Metropolitan region; Mobility 2030 Plan, adopted by the 
Regional Transportation Council on January 11, 2007" (TXDOT, 2009) 
SH 130 
Exhibit 17 - "Competing Facilities exclude all highway projects located outside 
of the following Competing Facilities Zone [see included map]...Competing 
Facilities exclude all highway projects included in any of the following long 
range transportation plans and programs: (see list) as in existence at the 
effective date";  Also excluded: frontage roads except where adding a 3rd lane 
in segment 5, all I-35" (TXDOT, 2007) 
Table 2.4 – Limited Compete Clause Unifying Language 
2.3 Competing Facilities Compensation Provisions 
As mentioned previously, in the contracts executed in the last 10 years, 
especially the contracts executed after 2010, there appears to be a trend toward 
exclusively including competing facilities compensation provisions without limiting 
the facilities that may be considered competing.  As with limited compete provisions, 
these provisions still explicitly state that the State is given an unfettered right to 
pursue competing facilities, regardless of the revenue impact to the Developer; this 





Project Competing Facilities Compensation Provision - Unifying Language 
I-77 Express Lanes 
Article 11.3.1 "Except for the limited rights to compensation provided 
to the Developer under Section 11.3.2 NCDOT will have the 
unfettered right in its sole discretion, at any time and without liability, 
regardless of impacts on Toll Revenues, to finance, develop, expand, 
improve, modify, upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, 
restore, renew and replace any existing and new transportation or other 
facilities...Such rights extends to facilities...whether identified or not 
identified in transportation plans, and whether adjacent to, nearby or 
otherwise located as to affect the Project" (NCDOT, 2014) 
Midtown/Downtown 
Tunnel 
12.04 - Development of Other Facilities: "Except for the right of the 
Concessionaire to receive compensation set forth in Section 12.05 with 
respect to Alternative Facilities, the State Parties will have the 
unlimited right, each in its sole discretion, at any time and without 
liability, to finance, develop, approve, construct, expand, improve, 
modify, upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, restore, 
renew and replace any existing and new transportation or other 
facilities other than the Project outside of the Project Right of Way... 
whether adjacent to, nearby or otherwise located as to affect the 
Project...its vehicular traffic and/or its revenues" (VDOT, 2011) 
North Tarrant 
Express 
Article 11.3.1 "Except for the limited rights to compensation provided 
to Developer under Section 11.3.2, TxDOT will have the right in its 





on Toll Revenues, to finance, develop, approve, expand, improve, 
modify, upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, restore, 
renew and replace any existing and new transportation or other 
facilities" (TXDOT, 2009) 
US-36 
Article 29.8: "Without prejudice to the Concessionaire’s rights arising 
out of any Compensation Event in relation to an Unplanned Revenue 
Impacting Facility, HPTE and any HPTE Related Party will have 
the unfettered right in its or their sole discretion and at any time and 
from time to time, without liability to the Concessionaire, regardless of 
impacts on Toll Revenues, to develop, expand, improve, modify, 
upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, restore, renew 
replace or close any existing or new transportation or other facilities of 
any type whatsoever." (HPTE, 2014) 
I-95 Express Lanes 
12.04 - Development of Other Facilities: "Except for the right of the 
Concessionaire to receive compensation set forth in Section 12.02, 
12.04 (d), 12.05 and 12.06, the State Parties will have the unlimited 
right, each in its sole discretion, at any time and without liability, to 
finance, develop, approve, construct, expand, improve, modify, 
upgrade, add capacity to, reconstruct, rehabilitate, restore, renew and 
replace any existing and new transportation or other facilities other than 
the Project, ... , and to otherwise improve the GP Lanes and other 
roadways and structures within or adjacent to the I-95 Corridor 





whether nearby or otherwise located as to affect the Project, its 
operation and maintenance, ... , its vehiclular traffic and/or its 
revenues" (VDOT, 2012) 
Table 2.5 – Competing Facilities Compensation Clause Unifying Language 
These contracts outline compensation procedures for when competing 
facilities affect the toll revenue of the private project; many, but not all, of the limited 
compete provisions outline similar compensation provisions as well.  Additionally, in 
this provision type if a competing facility results in an increase in revenue for the 
concessionaire, the concessionaire would typically be responsible for compensating 
the State DOT for the increase in revenue associated with the competing facility; US-
36 however does not contain a specific compensation provision, but does treat 
revenue impacting competing facilities as compensation events.  While these 
provisions are detailed, generally, the compensation amount is equal to the net 
increase or decrease in revenue that can be directly attributable to the revenue 
impacting facility or facilities.  However, the method for calculating this amount is 
slightly varied and often complex.  
A major difference between these contracts and contracts with limited 
compete provisions is that generally, competing facilities are defined broadly as any 
facility which would directly impact the net revenue of the private facility, and do not 





can be directly attributable to that specific facility.  The I-95 case is the only one 
which qualifies competing facilities further. In the case of the I-95 Express Lanes, the 
contract specifically identifies planned facilities that would trigger a compensation 
event if they were implemented.  The specific contract language which refers to these 
compensation events is included in Section 12.05 – Alternative Facilities, and is as 
follows: 
 “…(b) Route One Improvements. The Route One Improvements will be treated as a 
Compensation Event unless the Highest Revenue Share IRR has been reached as of 
the Commencement of Use of the Route One Improvements. (c) Occoquan Bridge 
Improvements. The Occoquan Bridge Improvements will be treated as a 
Compensation Event unless the Highest Revenue Share IRR has been reached as of 
the Commencement of Use of the Occoquan Bridge Improvements. (d) Southern HOT 
Lanes. The Southern HOT Lanes will be treated as a Compensation Event unless (i) 
the Highest Revenue Share IRR has been reached as of the Commencement of Use of 
the Southern HOT Lanes or (ii) the Concessionaire develops and constructs the 
Southern HOT Lanes as a Concessionaire Project Enhancement.” (VDOT, 2012) 
This continuity in competing facilities provisions, and how these recent 
examples differ from previous examples of the same type, suggests learning and 
growth on the part of the private sector, the public sector or both.  The above analysis 
of toll concession contracts in the U.S. over approximately 20 years demonstrates a 
trend toward uniformity and flexibility.  The recent toll concession contracts 
acknowledge the right and need of the public sector to improve and maintain the 





that these actions can have on the revenues of the private transportation facility.  
Additionally, recent contracts attempt to establish procedures for addressing claims 
relating specifically to competing facilities when they arise.   
2.3 –Non-Compete Provision and Revenue Risk 
As discussed, the above analysis of toll concession contracts suggests an 
evolution of non-compete provisions in the U.S. from the early 1990s to today.  This 
analysis shows that on the whole there has been a movement toward acknowledging 
the right and obligation of the State to expand and improve upon the transportation 
network, crafting specific compensation procedures to address the impact of 
competing facilities on the concessionaire, and a move away from strict non-compete 
provisions.  Especially given this shift across the board, it is important to understand 
the ways in which different non-compete provision models utilized in the United 
States affect revenue risk.  
In this analysis of 13 toll concession contracts, the approaches utilized to 
address competing facilities have fallen into four general categories; contracts which 
contain no competing facilities provision or reference to competing facilities, 
contracts with strict non-compete provisions, contracts containing limited compete 
provisions, and contracts containing competing facilities compensation provisions.  
The last two categories are similar in that they both explicitly acknowledge the rights 
of the State relating to competing facilities.  As mentioned previously, the evolution 
of competing facilities provisions in the United States has generally been from strict 





To determine the revenue risk in each project case two markers were used, the 
debt risk spread, measured in terms of basic points (BPS) and the equity risk 
premium.  For this analysis, the debt risk spread is defined as the bond yield minus 
the risk-free 20-year of 30-year Treasury bond rate; the difference between these two 
values then represents the risk premiums associated with debt financing.  Similarly, 
the equity risk premium is equal to the equity return minus the 20-year or 30-year 
Treasury bond rate; the difference in this case indicating the risk premium associated 
with equity investment.   Figure 2.1 shows both the debt risk spread and the equity 
risk premium for each toll concession analyzed: 
 


















































The figure appears to show that the model utilized to address non-compete 
provisions has an insignificant impact on equity return; however, there appear to be 
clear differences in debt risk spread among the models.  As this figure demonstrates, 
the non-compete provision case is associated with lower risk for the private sector, as 
seen by the debt risk spread.  The low debt risk suggests that non-compete provisions 
can reduce the exposure to revenue risk caused by actions taken by the public sector, 
such as developing competing facilities.  Therefore, strict non-compete provisions are 
the most effective for the private sector due to the low revenue risk associated with 
these provisions. All contracts surveyed that contain a strict non-compete provision, 
SR-91, the Indiana Toll Road and Pocahontas 895, have debt risk spreads that are 
lower than 150 BPS; only SH 130, which utilizes a limited compete provision with a 
Competing Facilities Zone used to exclude competing projects has a debt risk spread 
below this threshold, all others are above 150 BPS.  The project with both the lowest 
debt risk spread at 10 BPS and the lowest equity risk premium at 7.45%, Pocahontas 
895 Concession in Virginia, is significantly lower than that of any other project 
utilizing a different competing facilities approach.   
On the opposite end of the spectrum, contracts which include no competing 
facilities language, provide no protection to the private sector from actions taken by 
the public sector; in this case the private sector is left exposed to this revenue risk.  
The debt risk spread shows this as all projects with no provision are 250 BPS or 
higher.  Arguably the most notable example of this model, The Dulles Greenway, has 
both the highest debt risk spread, at 290 BPS, and the highest equity risk premium, at 





The final two models for addressing competing facilities, the limited compete 
provision and competing facilities compensation provision approach provide 
flexibility for the public sector while still providing some protection for the private 
sector, but as the figure shows not as much protection is provided as in the non-
compete provision case.  This is shown by the higher debt risk spread across the 
board in both cases. However, it is also important to note the range of debt risk 
spreads seen in the limited competed case.  The highest debt risk spread seen in this 
category is that of the LBJ Expressway at 287 BPS, which is on par with that of the 
Dulles Greenway.  Conversely the lowest debt risk spread is that of SH 130 at just 70 
BPS, lower than the Indiana Toll Road which utilizes a strict non-compete provision.  
Contracts which contain competing facilities compensation provisions are more 
closely clustered. This range could be due in part to the varying contract language 
within the limited compete. Other factors associated with project risk could account 
for these differences as well.  
2.3.1 - Statistical Analysis of Provisions and Revenue Risk 
The figure in the above section appears to show that the model utilized to 
address non-compete provisions has an insignificant impact on equity return. 
Statistical analysis of the equity risk premiums appears to confirm this assumption. 
To analyze the differences among the equity risk premiums, one-way between 
subjects ANOVA analyses were conducted to determine if the differences displayed 
above were significant.  This analysis indicated there were no significant differences 
between the equity risk premiums of groups of projects with non-compete provisions, 





competing facilities compensation provisions at the p<.05 level [F (3,9) = 0.924, p = 
0.468].  These results confirm the assumption stated in the previous section, that non-
compete provisions appear to have an insignificant effect on equity returns, and were 
not explored further.    
For the debt risk spread, the figure in the above section appeared to show 
distinct differences between the various types of non-compete provisions.  One-way 
between subjects ANOVA analyses were conducted to determine if the differences 
displayed above were significant.  This analysis indicated that there were significant 
differences between the debt risk spread of projects with non-compete provisions, 
without non-compete provisions, with limited compete provisions, and those with 
competing facilities compensation provisions at the p<.05 level [F (3,9) = 5.574), p = 
0.019].  To explore these results further, independent samples t-tests were conducted 
individually to see between which groups differences occur. 
 NCP No NCP Limited 
Compete 
Compensation 
 t df t df t df t df 
NCP - 4.36* 3   4.72** 6 
No NCP 4.36* 3 - .91 3 2.24 5 
Limited 
Compete 
1.92 4 .913 3 - -.25 2.22 
Compensation 4.72** 6 2.24 5 -.25 2.22 - 
n 3 2 3 5 
M 50.67 270.5 193.33 209.60 
SD 64.47 28.99 111.5 33.29 
* p<.05, **p<.01 
Table 2.6 – Independent Sample t-test of Debt Risk Spread by Provision Type 
The above table suggests that significant differences in debt risk spread exist, 
but not between all groups. Contracts containing strict non-compete provisions had 





significant differences did not exist between contracts with strict non-compete 
provisions and contracts with limited compete provisions. These results suggest that 
the evolution of non-compete provisions in the U.S., from strict non-compete clauses 
to competing facilities compensation provisions, represents a move toward a more 
balanced approach to dealing with competing facilities. The explicit 
acknowledgement of public sector priorities and responsibilities in the newer 
generation of P3 contracts supports this conclusion as well. However, it is unclear 
what differences exist between competing facilities compensation provisions and 
limited compete provisions. Perhaps more importantly, it is unclear what differences 
exist between limited compete provisions and strict non-compete provisions.  
2.4 – Conclusions 
P3 projects are still relatively new in the U.S., however there has been an 
evolution in contract non-compete provisions at least in part in response to lessons 
learned from completed projects. Contracts in newer P3 projects explicitly 
acknowledge the rights and responsibilities of the public sector relating to competing 
facilities. They appear to strive toward a more balanced approach to dealing with 
competing facilities and the associated revenue risk. A comparison of the debt risk 
spread and equity return across all non-compete provision types suggests that the non-
compete provision model used influences the risk from the perspective of the debt 
holder, but not necessarily the perspective of the equity holder.   
Further, statistical analysis showed that there are significant differences 
between the debt risk spread in contracts that have strict non-compete provisions and 





provisions and limited compete provisions. Like the acknowledgement of public 
sector rights and responsibilities, this suggests that competing facilities provisions 
represent a move toward a more balanced approach to dealing with competing 
facilities than strict provisions used in early P3 contracts.  However, there were not 
significant differences among limited compete and competing facilities compensation 
provisions, and between these provision types and contracts which contain no 
provision.  This raises questions about the protections that limited compete provisions 
and competing facilities compensation provisions provide, and the advantages and 
disadvantages between the two. Perhaps more importantly, there were not significant 
differences between the debt risk spread in strict non-compete provisions and limited 
compete provisions, calling into question the additional protections this provision 
type provides. 
As noted previously, there are many other aspects that are factored into 
overall project risk, none of which were examined in this study.  Additionally, the 
language in compensation provisions, and their specific requirements were not 
examined in detail.  The requirements associated with the compensation provisions 
can often be restrictive, a fact which was not measured. Both should be considered in 
detail in future studies. Additionally, all projects containing competing facilities 
compensation provisions are relatively new. It remains to be seen how effective these 






Chapter 3: Valuing Non-Compete Provisions in Public-Private 
Partnerships with Real Options Analysis 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
In the US, Public-Private Partnerships (P3) are increasingly utilized to close 
the gap between revenues and expenditures in transportation mega-projects.  
According to the Federal Highway Administration, there are currently 35 states, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico which have P3 enabling legislation, while the 
Build America Transportation Investment Center points out that additional states have 
P3 activities without P3 enabling legislation, and still more are contemplating P3 
enabling legislation currently (FHWA, 2016b; BATIC, 2016).  Although P3 
procurement can be a valuable tool, there exist several challenges to successful 
utilization. The public has historically been skeptical of the use of P3 procurement in 
the US; a reality which can limit public sector flexibility in short and long-range 
transportation planning.  This skepticism is acutely shown in relation to non-compete 
provisions. The I-77 Expressway in North Carolina is one recent example of these 
negative sentiments.  Several articles in the Charlotte Observer, as well as other 
publications, detailed concerns related to the competing facilities provision 
specifically (Harrison, 2015a, 2015b; Widen I-77, 2017).  These articles generally 
argued that the private sector was getting a better deal than the public sector, and that 
the non-compete provision was not in the public’s best interest. Additionally, 
questions of equality were raised as the contract was perceived to easily allow for 





concerns are hardly new.  The SR-91 project in California, one of the first P3 
procurements in the US, encountered this negative public perception as well. One 
study showed that during the first four years the SR-91 Express Lanes (91X) were 
open, approval of private organizations operating toll roads for profit dropped from 
50-75% to 30-45% approval; this trend was not seen in approval of publicly run toll 
roads (Sullivan, 2000).  As with recent projects, the 91X project was often strongly 
condemned by the press. The non-compete provision was described as giving the 
concessionaire, California Private Transportation Company (CPTC), a monopoly over 
the SR 91 freeway. CPTC was also accused of favoring profit over public safety, even 
sacrificing safety for profit, and repeatedly raising toll rates (Sullivan, 2000).  
However, it could be argued that this criticism ignored the public benefits the 91X 
project provided; the project had a positive impact on congestion in the overall 
corridor and was procured as a P3 because the region was unable to fund the 
necessary improvement (Sullivan, 2000).  
In some ways, the public and private sectors have the same goals in any P3 
project, specifically to deliver a successful project. However, in other ways priorities 
are competing, with the private sector looking to maximize profit and the public 
sector to provide socio-economic benefits. The conventional wisdom is that P3s 
generally, and non-compete provisions in P3 contracts specifically, are a zero-sum 
game, in which the losses of one party directly balance the gains of the other.  
Arguments for non-compete provisions include that they are necessary to protect the 
private party and help to encourage private sector investment in toll roads.  However, 





when needed.  The design and selection of non-compete provisions can and must be 
such that the objectives of the public and private sectors are not in direct conflict with 
each other.  Balancing risks while maximizing the objectives of both parties is key to 
the successful delivery of any P3 project. 
In recent years, non-compete provisions in the US have evolved, at least 
partially in response to lessons learned from previous projects such as the 91X 
project.  These lessons include the importance of striking a balance between public 
and private sector objectives, and the need to develop methods for identifying and 
permitting improvements that align with the public sector’s objectives (Persad et al., 
2005). These changes have been incorporated into what is deemed the ‘second 
generation’ of non-compete clauses, the limited compete clause, which acknowledges 
the responsibility of the State to act in the public interest and pursue improvements 
when necessary (Buxbaum and Ortiz, 2009; Iseki and Houtman, 2012).  This public-
sector flexibility increases the private sector revenue risk by some amount, 
presumably reflected in project costs. As such, it is important that the public-sector be 
able to value this flexibility.  
This flexibility in contract design has been analyzed using real options theory 
by many researchers (Wang and de Neufville, 2005; Ford et al, 2010; Chiara et al, 
2007; Alonso-Conde et al, 2007; Xiong and Zhang, 2016; Liu et al, 2014). Wang and 
de Neufville (2005) clarified real options theory to include real options “in” projects, 
which includes flexibility in design, and not just real options “on” projects, which 
largely consists of the valuation of investment opportunities. Ford et al. (2010) 





considering and evaluating dynamic uncertainty is critical, and under investigated 
through a case study of a BOT toll road project. Both Chiara et al. (2007), and 
Alonso-Conde et al. (2007) apply real options to revenue guarantees in BOT projects. 
Alonso-Conde et al. (2007) use a case study of the Melbourne City Link to analyze 
two embedded real options included in the project; the ability of the private sector to 
defer contractual payments to the public sector and the ability of the public sector to 
terminate the contract early. This study found that the net value of these embedded 
options to the concessionaire totaled 10% of the value of the company, showing the 
significance of the value transferred. Chiara et al. (2007) uncovered similar results 
that suggest that real options analysis should be conducted before utilizing revenue 
guarantees as they might not be the ideal strategy for mitigating revenue risk from the 
public sectors perspective. Xiong and Zhang (2016) consider renegotiations as real 
options in a concession, noting as other have that the option value can be quite large, 
increasing in value with uncertainty. Liu et al. (2014) model the “guarantee of 
restrictive competition”, also known as non-compete, as an American put option. In 
this study, the asset is the right of the private sector to make claims to the government 
when competition is damaging. This study found that the value of restrictive 
competition can be significant, 10% of the project NPV in the presented case study. 
The intent of this paper is to demonstrate the cost of non-compete provisions 
from the public sector’s perspective in terms of the loss of flexibility to pursue 
transportation projects, and the loss of associated benefits. The SR-91 Express Lane 
project in California will be used as a simple case study to show the potential value of 





utilized is more appropriate than traditional methodologies, as it is more flexible and 
can help the public-sector value this often-used revenue risk mitigation strategy. 
3.2 – Real Options Background 
To understand real options analysis, it is helpful to first understand financial 
options theory, from which real options theory evolved. A financial option is a right, 
but not an obligation to take an action on an underlying asset at a previously agreed 
upon price on or prior to a previously agreed upon date (Kodukula and Papudesu, 
2006; Mun, 2002). There exist a wide range of options, but the most common are call 
and put options. A call option, gives the holder of the option the right, but not the 
obligation to buy an underlying asset for an agreed upon price on or prior to an agreed 
upon date. Conversely, a put option gives the option holder the right to sell that asset. 
European options are those that require the holder of the option to exercise their right 
at a single point in time, while American options allow the holder to exercise their 
right at any point in the predetermined period.  
As real options are an extension of financial options, this basic framework and 
set of principles remains. The definition of a real option is the same as that for a 
financial option, with the caveat that real options apply to non-financial assets. There 
are many common real options including the option to expand, which typically 
involves scaling up a project, moving into new markets, products, or strategies, or 
expanding operations (Kodukula and Papudesu, 2006; Mun, 2002). This option is 
common in situations where standard valuation methodologies, such as net present 
value (NPV) are inappropriate due to high levels of uncertainty. In typical 





significant value could exist in future opportunities that may be ignored by a short-
term outlook, utilizing standard valuation methods. These high levels of uncertainty 
exist in the case of highway improvements. In a concession with a long concession 
period, future traffic volumes are a major source of uncertainty. From the private 
sector perspective, this impacts the revenue risk, or the risk that project revenues are 
insufficient to cover costs and debt while producing an adequate return on investment 
(Chiara et al., 2007). From the public sector perspective, this uncertainty impacts their 
ability to provide a minimum level of service, or the quality of traffic service 
provided relating to speed, travel time, and traffic interruptions among other factors 
(AASHTO, 2001). Benefits associated with improved level of service include travel 
time savings, emissions reductions, and reductions in accident costs among others. As 
such, the value associated with the option to expand from the public sector 
perspective can be significant, depending on the uncertainty.     
In the case of non-compete provisions in P3 projects, the underlying asset is 
the social benefits associated with transportation improvements that would have been 
possible if not for the contractual restriction. The ability to value these potential 
future social benefits, this public-sector flexibility is what sets real options analysis 
apart from traditional valuation methodologies. This flexibility can be modelled as a 
call option, as without the restriction of a non-compete provision, the public sector 
would have the option to “purchase” the social benefits associated with roadway 
improvements through initiating a project. This is an American option, as the social 
benefits associated with the transportation improvements could be realized at any 





would be Max[(S − K), 0], the maximum of the difference between the underlying 
asset value and the strike price, or the price at which the asset can be bought, and 
zero. This is true as it is assumed that the holder of the option will only exercise that 
option if it is beneficial to do so. This relationship is illustrated in the figure below; In 
the P3 case, the strike price would be the cost of the transportation improvements; 
construction costs.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Payoff Diagram for a Call Option. Adapted from Project Valuation Using 
Real Options: A Practitioners Guide, by P. Kodukula and C. Papudesu, 2006. 
Copyright 2006 by J. Ross Publishing, Inc. 
There are two major assumptions behind options pricing models that are 
important to note.  The first is the no arbitrage assumption. In short, assuming that no 
arbitrage opportunities exist means that it is impossible to purchase an asset at one price 
and simultaneously sell that asset at a higher price; this is the principle that there is no 





of replicating portfolios. A replicating portfolio is a portfolio of other traded assets that 
has the same payoff as the option. Critics argue that these assumptions don’t hold true 
in the case of real assets. Some argue that the replicating portfolios assumption is 
invalid as most real assets are not traded assets. However, Kodukula and Papudesu 
(2006) note that it has been argued that being able to create a replicating portfolio on 
paper for the real option in question should suffice. Critics also question the no 
arbitrage assumption, arguing that real assets are not as liquid as financial assets and 
thus the no arbitrage assumption does not hold. To address this assumption, 
practitioners use several types of adjustments, including utilizing an interest rate that is 
slightly higher than the riskless rate, in order to account for any resulting overvaluation 
(Kodukula and Papudesu, 2006). This approach has been utilized in this study. 
Although typically used to value investment in terms of some form of currency, 
real options have been used to value assets where currency is not a relevant measure, 
and where markets for an option do not exist. Knight (2014) utilized real options based 
on prospect theory to value flexibility in naval ship design. Knight’s framework utilizes 
utility theory to express the option value, then prospect theory as a risk adjustment 
mechanism. A central tenet of prospect theory is that individuals tend to view risk in 
terms of gains and losses rather than total value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1983). 
Additionally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe that individuals are loss averse. 
Significantly, Knight (2014) observes that this conclusion that individuals weight 
outcomes by non-linear decision weights is similar to the non-linear risk-neutral 





3.2.1 Binomial Tree Method 
There are many ways to model the underlying asset when pricing an option. 
One common method is utilizing a discrete time model such as recombining binomial 
trees. This method is generally accepted in practice as it is simpler to explain and 
understand, allows for transparency, and provides simple solutions for an option price 
(Mun, 2006). For the problem analyzed in this paper, the binomial tree depicted in 
Figure 2 will be utilized. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Recombining Binomial Tree. Reprinted from Real Options Analysis: Tolls 
and Techniques for Valuing Strategic Investments and Decisions, by J. Mun, 2002. 
Copyright 2002 by J. Ross Publishing, Inc. 
In this model, the underlying asset is S , the value of which is the social 
benefits associated with a competing facility. As Figure 2 depicts, with each step the 
asset either increases or decreases, by an up factor (u) or down factor (d), and follows 
this pattern with each time increment. The up and down factors depend on the 





u = √∆  




∆  is the time duration of each step;  
δ is the underlying volatility of the asset. 
The remaining key equation in this framework is that for risk-neutral 
probability, used to calculate the option value. Using risk neutral probabilities as 
discussed in Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic Investment Decisions, 
involves adjusting the probabilities which lead to the option value throughout the 
binomial tree, and then discounting these at the risk-free rate (p. 163). This risk-





where r is the risk-free interest rate, and u, d and ∆  are as defined previously. 
The binomial tree structure is created by starting with the value of the 
underlying asset, S , and multiplying it by the up and down factors, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. As the figure suggests, the first and nth values of the underlying asset are as 
shown below: 
= ×  or = ×  
= ×  





After the binomial tree is created, the value of the option at the terminal nodes 
must be calculated. This value is calculated through the maximization of exercising 
the option and letting it expire, as depicted in the equation below: 
Call Option Value = Max[(S − K), 0] 
The call option value at earlier nodes is then calculated through backwards 
induction, using the risk-neutral probability calculated previously, and the equation 
below: 
∆ , = ∆ ( , + , ) 
This process is conducted back to the starting period, calculating the option 
value at time zero, which represents the value of the option. 
The SR-91 Express Lane project in California is utilized as a simplified 
example to demonstrate how real options analysis could be used in valuing a non-
compete provision from the public-sector perspective using a single, isolated option. 
As mentioned, in this case the option value is equal to the social benefits lost through 
the inclusion of a non-compete provision in a particular case.  
3.3 – Case Study: SR-91 
The 91 Express Lanes (91X) are four express toll lanes located in the median 
of California State Route 91, stretching for 10-miles between Anaheim and the 
Orange/Riverside County line. The project was one of the first public-private 
partnerships (P3) in the state of California and was procured using a design-build-
finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) model; it was one of the pilot projects approved 
under the P3 enabling legislation, California Assembly Bill 680 in 1989. Not only 





first practical application of value pricing in the US, and the first toll facility with 
100% electronic toll collection (FHWA, 2017a). The state of California elected to 
pursue the capacity improvements on SR-91 as a P3 due to the lack of available 
funding needed to pursue this project in a reasonable period (Sullivan, 2000). The 
project opened in 1995 and was constructed for $135 million. California Private 
Transportation Company (CPTC), was responsible for financing and building the 
facility, as well as operating and maintaining it for a 35-year concession period. 
CPTC was also responsible for toll collection, although Caltrans was contractually 
able to limit the rate of return. The contract between CPTC and Caltrans also 
contained a non-compete provision, which restricted the ability of Caltrans to 
construct competing facilities within an Absolute Protection Zone covering a 1.5-mile 
corridor around the facility. These restrictions included preventing Caltrans from 
adding capacity to the general purpose lanes on SR-91.  
Several years into the operation of the 91X lanes, Caltrans began planning to 
add an outer lane to the SR-91 general purpose lanes at the intersection with the 
Eastern Toll Road, also the entry/exit point to the toll facility, citing safety concerns 
due to bottlenecks at this point. CPTC viewed this action as a violation of the non-
compete clause, as it would add capacity to the general purpose lanes, and sued 
Caltrans. Ultimately this dispute was settled for $12 million, which allowed Caltrans 
to continue plans to add capacity at this location. However, after this settlement, 






3.3.1 – Eastern Toll Road 
The Eastern Toll Road is a 16-mile, 8-lane highway which runs parallel to SR-
91 in Orange County, California. It opened to traffic in October 1998 and was built 
by the public-sector, fully publicly funded and is operated by the Orange County 
Transportation Agency (TCA). The total cost of construction was $850 Million. 
According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Eastern Toll Road was 
proposed to accommodate traffic growth in the region due to planned growth, 
specifically to relieve congestion on existing roadways, improve traffic flow and 
mitigate emissions impacts. These improvements were considered essential even 
considering planned and ongoing improvements to adjacent freeways including SR-
91, SR-55, SR-57 and I-5. The FEIS published in 1994 cites traffic studies which 
estimate traffic volumes on the Eastern Toll Road at 77,000 to 108,000 vehicles per 
day (p. S-3).  
Prior to the completion of the Eastern Toll Road in 1998, the 91X lanes saw a 
steady increase in traffic reaching a peak of 33,000 vehicles per day. A case study of 
the 91X lanes reported that the project appeared to be maintaining acceptable 
financial performance, stating that it was anticipated to yield a favorable rate of return 
over the concession period regardless of the potential impacts of the Eastern Toll 
Road. However, the opening of the Eastern Toll Road did lead to a drop in traffic on 
the 91X facility during the initial 6-8 months it was open, stabilizing at 24,000 
vehicles per day; these facilities directly compete for commute travel into the Irvine 
area (Sullivan, 2000). 
The Eastern Toll Road utilizes fixed price tolls, as opposed to the variable 





with distance, but not with traffic volumes like the 91X lanes. At the opening of the 
project, the average toll on the Eastern Toll Road was $3.25, slightly less than that for 
peak traffic in the 91X case. However, a study conducted for Caltrans showed that 
during the first four years 91X was open, approval of private organizations operating 
toll roads for profit dropped from 50-75% to 30-45%; this trend was not seen in 
approval of public run toll roads (Sullivan, 2000). As the Eastern Toll Road was the 
option operated by the public sector at the time, this trend in public opinion favored 
using the Eastern Toll Road over the 91X lanes.  
3.3.2 – Analysis 
As mentioned previously, in the case of non-compete provisions in public-
private partnership projects there is value lost from the public-sector’s perspective 
due to the restrictions associated with non-compete or competing facilities provisions. 
This value is equal to the social benefits associated with transportation improvements 
that are not possible due to the non-compete provision and the specific restrictions the 
provision imposes. As these social benefits are associated with public sector 
flexibility, the flexibility to pursue transportation improvements if and/or when they 
become necessary, real options analysis is more appropriate than traditional valuation 
methodologies in determining their value.  
The SR-91 project is a notable example as the contract contained a strict non-
compete provision which prevented the public sector from pursuing any 
transportation improvements within an Absolute Protection Zone, a 1.5-mile corridor 
surrounding the project. This Absolute Protection Zone prohibited Caltrans from 





Eastern Toll Road, and ultimately led to Caltrans buying the facility back from the 
California Private Transportation Company (CPTC). The non-compete provision 
included in the SR-91 Express Lanes project did not affect the Eastern Toll Road, it 
was already underway prior to the completion of the 91X project.  However, the 
Eastern Toll Road project is an ideal candidate for this analysis for several reasons. 
The Eastern Toll Road is a comparable, parallel, competing facility. A case study of 
the SR 91 Express Lanes completed for Caltrans showed that this facility negatively 
impacted the traffic on the SR 91 Express Lanes. A review of toll concession in the 
US showed that all projects which contained a non-compete, limited compete or 
competing facilities compensation provision had at least one parallel facility in the 
National Highway System, as shown in Table 1 below. This shows the importance of 
modeling a simple parallel facility scenario.  
Project Name Parallel Roadways Provision Type 
I-495 HOT Lanes VA-7, VA-120 Limited Compete 
I-77 Express Lanes NC-115, NC-16 
Compensation 
Provision 
I-95 Express Lanes US-1 
Compensation 
Provision 









Elizabeth River Tunnels 
(Midtown & Downtown 
Tunnels) US-460, I-64 
Compensation 
Provision 






SH 130 I-35 Limited Compete 






Pocahontas Parkway 895 I-64, VA-10 Non-Compete 
Indiana Toll road US-20, US-12, SR-2 Non-Compete 
Table 3.1 – Parallel National Highway System Roadways by Provision Type 
The interchange connecting the SR-91 Express Lanes to the Eastern Toll Road 
is at an entrance point to the toll facility, making it simple to bypass the 91X lanes 
using the Eastern Toll Road if desired. Improvements to the general purpose lanes at 
this interchange is what triggered the non-compete provision violation and ultimate 
sale of the SR-91 Express Lanes back to the public-sector. These factors, including 
data availability, make the Eastern Toll Road an idea candidate for valuing the option 
to build a comparable, parallel facility. 
In this case, the option to construct a parallel facility is “in the money” when 





constructing a project. The strike price, K at which the option of constructing the 
Eastern Toll Road becomes valuable is $850 Million.  
The underlying asset is the social benefits associated with constructing the 
Eastern Toll Road. According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for this 
facility, the roadway was considered necessary to decrease current and future 
congestion in a heavily trafficked corridor, and provide relief to surrounding 
facilities, even given planned improvements to facilities such as SR 91. It was 
pursued in part to achieve goals outlined in the Regional Mobility Plan, such as 
decreasing emissions and increasing mobility, along with other social benefits 
(FHWA, 1994). To estimate these benefits, the US Federal Highway Administration’s 
(FHWA) P3-VALUE Analytical Tool was used. This tool includes project delivery 
benefit cost analysis (PDBCA) which evaluates the economic efficiencies, and the 
societal costs and benefits, associated with a particular delivery method. This model 
uses standard benefit-cost analysis (BCA) methodologies and considers factors such 
as travel time costs, fuel costs, emissions costs, and accident costs among others are 
used to generate total benefits outputs (FHWA, 2016a). These are typical measures of 
the economic efficiency impact of a project accrued to both users and non-users of a 
facility. According to FHWA, BCA is one of many methodologies currently used for 
project prioritization and selection by State DOTs, and is an important tool that can 
be used to quantify economic impacts and better target transportation funding 
(FHWA, 2017b).  
The NPV of the benefits under Conventional Delivery was utilized to 





conventional delivery. However, the model suggests that pursuing this project as a P3 
would result in total additional benefits. The output summary generated by the P3-
VALUE Tool for conventional delivery benefits is shown below.  
Benefits & costs under Conventional Delivery   NPV @ 
3.00%  
 Real total  
 Units >>   USD m   USD m  
 ∆ Travel time cost  1,176  2,326  
 ∆ Delays due to construction  (6) (6) 
 ∆ Delays due to O&M  4  7  
 ∆ Delays due to incidents  499  964  
 ∆ Non-fuel costs  32  60  
 ∆ Fuel costs  (33) (53) 
 ∆ Accident costs  83  156  
 ∆ Emissions cost  (38) (82) 
 O&M No Build cost savings  197  350  
 Real construction costs  (804) (850) 
 Real operations costs  (100) (180) 
 Real base variability  (144) (160) 
 Real pure risks  (64) (83) 
 Lifecycle performance risk  (304) (518) 
 Total benefits / (costs) under Conventional Delivery  499  1,931  
 Benefit cost ratio under Conventional Delivery  1.4101   N/A  
Table 3.2 – P3-VALUE Tool PDBCA Output Summary (FHWA, 2016c) 
For the real options analysis, the 35-year concession period for the SR-91 
Express Lanes project was utilized for the time to maturity of the option. The 
underlying volatility of the asset was estimated to be 15%. The risk-free rate was 
estimated using the 30-year treasury rate for 1998, the year the Eastern Toll Road 
opened to traffic.  
All analysis parameters are summarized in the table below: 
Parameters   










Exercise Price X 
($m) 850 
Time to Maturity 35 
Periods 35 
Time Interval 1 
Discount Factor 0.945728263 
Up 1.161834 
Down 0.860708 
Table 3.3 – Real Options Analysis Parameters 
3.3.3 – Results 
An excel-based model was used to calculate the value of the call option, by 
first building the binomial tree, as shown in Figure 3.3 below.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Binomial Lattice Evolution of Social Benefits 
After that the option value at the terminal nodes was calculated, and then at 
the intermediate notes using backward induction, as explained in Section 2. This 
analysis was performed using the inputs shown in Table 3 above. The results of this 
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inhibited by the non-compete provision in the Eastern Toll Road case, is 
$405,500,244.  
This value is significant and shows the importance of the social benefits that a 
parallel, comparable facility could provide. This value is greater than the price at 
which Caltrans purchases the 91X facility from CPTC and the price of the original 
settlement for the violation of the non-compete provision, triggered by plans to widen 
general purpose lanes on SR 91, combined. However, the Eastern Toll Road was 
already built when this settlement and sale took place, and associated future social 
benefits could be realized without the purchase of the 91X facility. Previous studies 
using real options to value other revenue risk mitigation strategies, such as revenue 
guarantees, produced similar results, with the option value being significant. Taken 
together, these results suggest that a non-compete provision has great value and 
should be carefully considered prior to implementation. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to explore the effect of traffic volatility on 
the real option value of social benefits. As Figure 3.4 demonstrates, the value of the 







Figure 3.4 – Sensitivity Analysis 
These results demonstrate that the higher uncertainty, the higher the value 
associated with a non-compete provision. From a managerial standpoint, this suggests 
that real options analysis is most appropriate for projects with a high degree of 
uncertainty in estimates of future traffic volumes. Particularly for these projects, it is 
important for the public sector to perform real options analysis to understand the 
value of the flexibility lost through non-compete provisions and determine if they are 
the most appropriate strategy for mitigating revenue risk from the private sector 
perspective.  
3.4 – Conclusions 
Contract provisions designed to mitigate some revenue risk for the private 
sector, such as non-compete provisions and others, are often included to generate 
private sector interest in a project among other reasons. However, the literature 
suggests that not enough is known about the value of these provisions, or about the 





SR-91 Express Lanes and the Eastern Toll Road, a comparable, parallel facility were 
used to show how real options analysis can be used to value the social benefits lost 
through the inclusion of a non-compete provision. This analysis suggests that there is 
significant value associated with public-sector flexibility. Additionally, sensitivity 
analysis demonstrates that the option value increases rapidly with the increase in 
traffic volatility. This suggests that not only are non-compete provisions valuable, but 
they become more valuable with increased uncertainty in future traffic volumes. As 
previous work has suggested with revenue guarantees, this work suggests that real 
options analysis should be conducted by the public-sector prior to inclusion of a non-
compete provision in a P3 contract, particularly in cases where future traffic volumes 







Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Summary and Discussion 
In this study, the language 13 P3 contracts containing non-compete provisions 
were analyzed. This analysis demonstrated an evolution in non-compete provision 
type from earlier contracts through today. Contracts in newer P3 projects explicitly 
acknowledge the rights and responsibilities of the public sector relating to competing 
facilities. They appear to strive toward a more balanced approach to dealing with 
competing facilities and the associated revenue risk. A comparison of the debt risk 
spread and equity return across all non-compete provision types suggests that the non-
compete provision model used influences the risk from the perspective of the debt 
holder, but not necessarily the perspective of the equity holder.   
Further, statistical analysis showed that there are significant differences 
between the debt risk spread in contracts that have strict non-compete provisions and 
most others; significant differences did not exist between strict non-compete 
provisions and limited compete provisions. Like the acknowledgement of public 
sector rights and responsibilities, this suggests that competing facilities provisions 
represent a move toward a more balanced approach to dealing with competing 
facilities than strict provisions used in early P3 contracts.  However, there were not 
significant differences among limited compete and competing facilities compensation 
provisions, and between these provision types and contracts which contain no 





and competing facilities compensation provisions provide, and the advantages and 
disadvantages between the two. Perhaps more importantly, there were not significant 
differences between the debt risk spread in strict non-compete provisions and limited 
compete provisions, calling into question the additional protections this provision 
type provides. 
After analyzing the evolution of non-compete provisions in U.S. P3 contracts, 
this study focused on valuing a non-compete provision from the public-sector point of 
view.  A case study of the SR-91 Express Lanes and the Eastern Toll Road, a 
comparable, parallel facility were used to show how real options analysis can be used 
to value the social benefits lost through the inclusion of a non-compete provision. 
This analysis suggests that there is significant value associated with public-sector 
flexibility. As previous work has suggested with revenue guarantees, this work 
suggests that real options analysis should be conducted by the public-sector prior to 
inclusion of a non-compete provision in a P3 contract.  
Study Limitations and Future Work 
There are many other contract provisions, or project aspects that are factored 
into overall project risk, none of which were examined in this study.  Additionally, 
the language in compensation provisions, and their specific requirements were not 
examined in detail.  These provisions are often lengthy and complex, and have not 
been tested to date. The requirements associated with the compensation provisions 
can often be restrictive, a fact which was not measured. These factors should be 
considered in detail in future studies. Additionally, all projects containing competing 





effective these clauses are, and whether they protect the public’s interest while still 
incentivizing P3 investment.  
Additionally, the real options calculations are based on an isolated case; in 
reality there may be multiple, interacting options. The Eastern Toll Road was already 
built when this settlement and sale took place, and associated social benefits could be 
realized without the purchase of the 91X facility. Regardless, the large value 
associated with this option illustrates the importance of flexibility in the public-sector 
case. 
This study suggests that the value associated with public-sector flexibility can 
be significant. Movement has been made toward a more balanced approach to 
addressing competing facilities, however the more recent generation of provisions 
have not been analyzed in detail. Future work is needed in analyzing the 
compensation details in competing facilities compensation provisions. Additionally, 
more complex real options models should be utilized to more accurately measure the 








Alonso-Conde, A. B., Brown, C., & Rojo-Suarez, J. (2007). Public private 
partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options. Review of Financial 
Economics, 16(4), 335-349. doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2007.03.002 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials [AASHTO]. 
(2001). A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets. Washington, 
DC: AASHTO 
Build American Transportation Investment Center [BATIC]. (2016). Successful 
Practices for P3s: A review of what works when delivering transportation via 
public-private partnerships. Retrieved May 3, 2017 from 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/P3_Successful_Practic
es_Final_BAH.PDF  
Buxbaum, J. & Ortiz, I. (2009). NCHRP Synthesis 391: Public Sector Decision 
Making for Public-Private Partnerships. Washington, DC: Transportation 
Research Board. 
Buxbaum, J. & Ortiz, I. (June 2007). Protecting the Public Interest: The Role of 
Long-Term Concession Agreements for Providing Transportation 
Infrastructure. USC Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure 
Policy. 
Chiara, N., Garvin, M. J., & Vecer, J. (2007). Valuing Simple Multiple-Exercise Real 






Colorado High Performance Transportation Enterprise (2014, February 25). Amended 
and Restated Concession Agreement for US 36 and the I-25 Managed Lanes. 
Agreement between Colorado High Performance Transportation Enterprise 
and Plenary Roads Denver LLC. 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Conference Report 114-357 to 
Accompany H.R. 22, 114th Congress, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
114hrpt357/pdf/CRPT-114hrpt357.pdf.   
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]. (January 2016a). Benefit-Cost Analysis 
for Public-Private Partnership Project Delivery: A Framework. Retrieved May 
05, 2017, from https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/toolkit/analytical_tool/ 
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA] (2016b). Challenges and Opportunities 
Series: Public Private Partnerships in Transportation Delivery. Retrieved 
July 22, 2016 from 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/resources/challenges_and_opportunities/statu
tory_issues.aspx.  
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA] (September 1994). Eastern Transportation 
Corridor State Route 231: Final Environmental Impact Statement. Retrieved 
May 05, 2017, from http://www.dot.ca.gov/d12/DEA/241-
91/0K9700/ETCEIS/FinalETCEIR.pdf 
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]. (2016c). P3 Value 2.0 Analytical Tool. 





Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]. (2017a). Project Profiles: 91 Express 
Lanes. Retrieved May 05, 2017, from 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/project_profiles/ca_91expresslanes.aspx 
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]. "REPORT TO CONGRESSONPUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS." Report to Congress on Public-Private 
Partnerships, 12/04 - United States Department of Transportation. FHWA, 
Dec. 2004. Web. 08 May 2017. 
Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]."Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis by State 
Departments of Transportation: Report to Congress." U.S. Department of 
Transportation/Federal Highway Administration. N.p., 31 Jan. 2017b. Web. 
08 May 2017. 
Garvin, M. J., & Bosso, D. (2008). Assessing the Effectiveness of Infrastructure 
Public—Private Partnership Programs and Projects. Public Works 
Management & Policy, 13(2), 162-178. 
Harrison, S. (2015, May 17). As other cities protest, Charlotte leaders quietly accept 
terms of I-77 toll lane deal. Retrieved May 02, 2017, from 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article21253035.html 
Harrison, S. (2015, May 4). Toll contract could hinder new free lanes on Interstate 77. 
Retrieved May 02, 2017, from 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article20226147.html 






Iseki, H., & Houtman, R. (2012). Evaluation of progress in contractual terms: Two 
case studies of recent DBFO PPP projects in North America. Research in 
Transportation Economics, 36(1), 73-84. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, Values, and Frames. American 
Psychologist, 39(4):341-350.  
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision 
under risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263-291. 
Knight, J.T. (2014). A Prospect Theory-Based Real Options Analogy for Evaluating 
Flexible Systems and Architectures in Naval Ship Design (Doctoral 
Dissertation). 
Kodukula, P., and Chandra P. (2006). Project valuation using real options: a 
practitioner's guide. Ft. Lauderdale, FL: J. Ross Pub. 
Laris, M. (2016, December 24). Non-compete agreement in one Virginia tunnel 




Liu, J., Yu, X., & Cheah, C. Y. (2014). Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP 
projects using real option approach. International Journal of Project 
Management, 32(3), 473-481. doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007 
Mun, J. (2002). Real options analysis: tools and techniques for valuing strategic 





North Carolina Department of Transportation (2014, June 26). Comprehensive 
Agreement – I-77 HOT Lanes Project. Agreement between North Carolina 
Department of Transportation and I-77 Mobility Partners LLC 
Osei-Kyei, R., & Chan, A. P. (2015). Review of studies on the Critical Success 
Factors for Public–Private Partnership (PPP) projects from 1990 to 2013. 
International Journal of Project Management, 33(6), 1335-1346. 
Persad, K., Walton, M. & Wilke, J. (October 2005). Alternatives to Non-Compete 
Clauses in Toll Development Agreements. Austin, TX: Center for 
Transportation Research, The University of Texas at Austin 
State of California Department of Transportation (1993, July 16). Amended and 
Restated Development Agreement – State Route 91 Median Improvements. 
Agreement between State of California Department of Transportation and 
California Private Transportation Company, L.P.  
Sullivan, E. (December 2000). Continuation Study to Evaluate the Impacts of the SR 
91 Value-Priced Express Lanes: Final Report. San Luis Obispo, CA: 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cal Poly State 
University 
Texas Department of Transportation (2009, June 23). Comprehensive Development 
Agreement for a Concession – North Tarrant Express Facility. Agreement 






Texas Department of Transportation (2009, September 4). Comprehensive 
Development Agreement IH 635 Managed Lanes Project. Agreement between 
Texas Department of Transportation and LBJ Infrastructure Group LLC. 
Texas Department of Transportation (2007, March 22). Facility Concession 
Agreement – SH 130 Segments 5 and 6 Facility. Agreement between Texas 
Department of Transportation and SHA 130 Concession Company, LLC. 
The Indiana Finance Authority (2006, April 12). Indiana Toll Road Concession and 
Lease Agreement. Agreement between The Indiana Finance Authority and 
ITR Concession Company LLC. 
Virginia Department of Transportation (2007, December 19). Amended and Restated 
Comprehensive Agreement Relating to the Route 495 HOT Lanes in Virginia 
Project. Agreement between Virginia Department of Transportation and 
Capital Beltway Express LLC. 
Virginia Department of Transportation (1998, June 3). Comprehensive Agreement to 
Develop and Operate Route 895 Connector. Agreement between Virginia 
Department of Transportation and FD/MK Limited Liability Company. 
Virginia Department of Transportation (2011, December 5). Comprehensive 
Development Agreement Relating to the Downtown Tunnel/Midtown 
Tunnel/Martin Luther King Freeway Extension Project. Agreement between 






Virginia Department of Transportation (2012, July 31). Comprehensive Agreement 
Relating to the I-95 HOV/HOT Lanes Project. Agreement between Virginia 
Department of Transportation and 95 Express Lanes LLC. 
Virginia Department of Transportation (1993, September 28). The Dulles Toll Road 
Extension Comprehensive Development Agreement. Agreement between 
Virginia Department of Transportation and the Toll Road Investors 
Partnership II, L.P. 
Wang, T., & De Neufville, R. (2005, June). Real options “in” projects. In real 
options conference, Paris, France. 
Wang, Y. (2015). Evolution of public–private partnership models in American toll 
road development: Learning based on public institutions' risk management. 
International Journal of Project Management, 33(3), 684-696. 
Xiong, W., & Zhang, X. (2016). The Real Option Value of Renegotiation in Public–
Private Partnerships. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
142(8), 04016021. doi:10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
